



ASSIGNMENT OF DOWER UNDER MISTAKE OF
FACT.
CAsE.-A., having been married to B., was deserted by him.
He went abroad; and fdr more than seven years nothing was
heard of or from him. Without procuring any divorce, A. was then
married to C., and they lived together as husband and wife for
some years, and until C.'s death. C.. having died intestate, leaving
considerable real and personal property, by arrangement be-
tween his heirs and A. no administration was taken upon his
estate, but it was divided among the heirs; certain real estate,
by deed from the heirs, being conveyed to A., in lieu of all her
claims to dower, or as a distributee. All this time nothing had
been heard of or from B., and he was universally regarded as
dead. After this arrangement had been concluded and the divi-
sion of C.'s property completed, it was discovered that B. was still
*live; and thereupon the heirs. of (. claimed to recover from her
the real estate conveyed to her as aforesaid. A" the parties
were citizens and residents of Massachusetts, and the real estate
in controversy was there situated.
I. At the time of A.'s second marriage the presumption of law
was that B. was dead. In the absence of proof to the contrary
the law would have acted on this presumption by granting admin-
istration of his estate, and vesting his real property in his heirs.
And the presumption of law further is that A. supposed B. to be
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dead. Regina v. Curgerwen, 11 Jur. N. S. 984; Begina v. Jonvs ;.
1 Car. & M. 614; King v. Ttzjning, 2 B. & Ald. 386; Qreens-
borough v. Underhill, 12 Veriaont 604. And in Gibson v. State,
38 Miss. 313, this rule was declared where the absence from the
state was only for five years; and the presumption in favor of
the second marriage was allowed even to overbear the presump-
tion in favor of innocence. The marriage of A. to C. was therefore
deemed by the law to be valid when it took place (Commonwealth
v. Thompson, 6 Allen 591), and its invalidity can be shown only
by matter ex post facto-i. e., by the subsequent discovery that
B. was living at the time of such second marriage. But A. and
C. having cohabited as man and wife during the lifetime of the lat-'
ter, we hold that though C. might have had the marriage declared
null on proof of the facts, yet the law will not now, after his death,
inquire into its validity.: (ampbell v. Corley, 31 L. J. Mat. Cas.
60; U.opsey v. McKinney, 80 Barb. 47. In Gaines v. ifennen,
24 How. U. S. 553, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the issue of a bigamous marriage contracted by either party
in good faith is legitimate. A fortiori, therefore, where both par-
ties acted in good faith and on grounds upon which the law itself
would have acted, and the marriage was never impeached during
the lives of both parties, and all parties concerned have since
acted on the supposition of its validity, the court will not now
interfere with vested rights to property that have accrued in con-
.sideration of such marriage: White v. Lowe, 1 Redfield Sur.
.376. And on this principle, in an anonymous case, 2 Hem. & M.
'124, Vice-Chancellor WooD refused to determine the question of
* a child's legitimacy at the instance of a stranger. The same doc-
trine was maintained in Beavan v. Mcfahon, 5 Jur. N. S. 686,
in which, as here, the marriage was claimed to be null. And in
Louisiana and Texas it has been held that such a marriage, bond
.fide entered into by the parties in ignorance of the existence of
the impediment, is not only innocent of crime, but has all the
rights, incidents and privileges of lawful marriages: Lee T.
Smith, 18 Texas 141; Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Id. 731; Patton
v. Philadelphia, 1 La. Ann. 98. Therefore the marriage of A. to
,C. must now be deemed valid for all the purposes of this question.
II. But even if the marriage ceremony between A. and C. was
originally void, and now has no binding force, yet the heirs are
estopped from relying on this fact by their arrangement with A.,
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and their deed to her reciting this arrangement. The general
principles of estoppel by deed will apply here: 2 Smith's Lead.
Cas. *456; Somes v. Skinter, 8 Pick. 52; -0ommonwealth v.
Andr6, 3 Id. 224; tanes v. Boston & Bozbury Hill Corp'n,
4 Id. 865; Gibbs v. Thayer, 6 Cush. 30; Cutler v. Dickenson,
8 Pick. 386; .Paront v. Gloucester Bank, 10 Pick. 533; In re
.orth, 11 Jur. N. S. 218. Nor will the court refuse to give
effect to the estoppel upon the ground that the heirs of C. made
this agreement upon a mistake of fact, unless it appears affirma-
tively, and not merely hypothetically, that neither the heirs nor
A. would have made the agreement if they had known the true
state of the case; and non consat but that the same arrangement
-would have been made if all the facts had then been known to all
parties, in order to settle the question of law which would then
have arisen. The court must enforce the estoppel, unless it
would have cancelled the deeds; and that would only be done if
fraud were clearly alleged and distinctly proved :* Martin v.
,Westbrook, 7 L. T. N. S. 449. And this case also comes within
the ordinary principles of estoppel in pais. Had not the rights
of A. as widow of C. been recognised by the heirs, she would not
have consented to the amicable settlement of his estate; it would
-have -been thrown into the Probate Court; and she would'have
obtained, by judicial decree, her dower and her distributive share
of the personalty, since at that time the law must have pro-
nounced in favor of her marriage to C. The heirs therefore can-
not now be permitted to retract that settlement or to deny its
validity, without first putting A. into as good a position as she
would have occupied had not such settlement been made; that is,
they cannot be heard to deny that A. is entitled to all the rights
of a lawful wife of C. It is on this principle that it was decided
in Shattuck v. Grayg, 23 Pick. 88, that a parol assignment of
dower is absolutely conclusive upon the party -making it, and
estops him from denying the right of the dowress to be so en-
dowed. And in this case- the settlement made with A. in lieu of
.dower must at least be equally binding as if it had been a parol
assignment of dower, instead of by deed; and therefore certainly
the heirs cannot now deny her right to be endowed at all.
BRONSON, J., in .Dezell v. Odell 3 Hill 219, says that to consti-
tute an estoppel in pais against a party there must be, first, an
admission by the party inconsistent with the evidence which he
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proposes to give or the title or claim-which he proposes to set up;
secondly, an action by the other party upon such admission; and
thirdly, an injury to him by permitting the admission to be dis-
proved. Here all these elements concur. See 2 Smith's Lead.
Cas. (4th Am. Ed.) 562, Am. note; Smith v. Cudworth, 24 Pick;
196; -Dyer v. _Bich, 1 Met. 180; Fuller v. Boston Ins. Co., 4
Met. 206; Ese v. Barnard, 6 Jur. N. S. 621 ; Cornish v. Abing-
ton, 4 Hurls. & N. 549; Holding v. Elliott, 5 Id. 117. And
on the same principle by which one who has *contracted with
a corporation as such is estopped to deny its corporate existence
( Worcester Medical Institute v. Harding, 11 Cush. 285; Sein v.
Ind., &c., Ass'n, 18 Ind. 237; Pocheln v. Kemper, 14 La. An.
808; Hubbard v. Chapel, 14 Ind. 601), the heirs of C., having
made this settlement with A. as legally entitled to dower in C.'s
estate, are now estopped to deny that she is so entitled. In
White v. Brocaw, 14 Ohio St. 339, under circumstances much-
like these a compromise was held to work just such an estoppel
as is claimed here.
HI. But even if, at the death of C., A. had no right to any
portion of his estate, still the settlement between her and the
heirs, having been made by all parties in the utmost good faith as
a compromise of a right of action supposed by all concerned to be
vested in A., cannot now be disturbed in consequence of any dis-.
covery which may since have been made'that in point of fact A.-
was not entitled to what all parties then supposed to be her
rights. This settlement, having been carried out in full, stands
on much stronger ground than a mere executory contract, on the.
same principle that an accord and satisfaction, though without
force while remaining merely executory, becomes binding as soon
as carried into effect: Spring v. Lovett, 11 Pick. 417; 1owe v.
Mackay, 5 Id. 44. But an executory contract to pay money
is valid where the consideration is only the compromise of a claim
upon which the law is doubtful, or even upon which the parties
suppose the facts to be doubtful: Metcalf on Contracts 177.
The last is exactly this case. And the compromise of a claim is
a good consideration for an executory contract, even though liti--
gation has not actually begun, provided there be a reasonable
claim which it is bond fide intended to pursue: Id. ; Cook v.
Wright, 1 Best & Smith 559. And in Stapilton v. Stapilton, 1
Atkins 2, 3 White and Tudor's Lead. Cas. in Eq. *684 (3d Am.
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Ed. 880), Lord HARDWIOKE held that an agreemeint entered into
on a supposition of a right, or of a doubtful right, even though it
afterwards turn out that the right was on the other side, shall be
binding, and the right shall not prevail against the agreement of
the parties; for the right must always be upon the one side or
the other; and therefore the compromise of a doubtful right shall
be a sufficient foundation for an agreement. And the same prin-"
ciple has been ever since fully maintained. 2 White and Tudor's
Lead. Cas. in Eq. (3d Am. Ed.) 388, 406; 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 131
et seq.; I Parsons on Contracts (5th Ed.) 438 ; Lucy, ex parte,
4 De G., MacN. & G. 856; Adams v. Sage, 28 N. Y. 103; Thomp-
on v. Bennett, S4 Missouri 477. Parsons says, "With the
courts of this country prevention of litigation is not only a suffi-
cient, but a highly favored consideration; and no investigation
of the character or value of the different claims submitted will be
entered into for the purpose of setting aside the compromise, it
being sufficient if the parties entering into the compromise
thought at the time that there was a question between them."
Pars. on Cont. 438. And in Allis v. Billings, 2 Cush. 19, such
a compromise was not allowed to be impeached, even though it
was claimed to have been effected by fraud, and that the fraud
had been subsequently discovered. Equity will infer family ar-
rangements on slight:evidence, and will support them when prac-
ticable. Baylies v. Payson, 5 Allen 478; Gratz v. Cohen, 11
How. U. S. 1, in which our highest national tribunal refused to
set aside a family compromise, even though it appeared to be
subject to some doubts as to its fairness; Wakefield v. Gibbon, 1
Giff. 401; Willoughby v. Brideoak, 11 Jur. N. S. 524 and (on
appeal) 706; Williams v. William, 2 Drew. & Sm. 378; -Par-
tridge v. Smith, 9 Jur. N. S. 742; Bentley v. Mtackay, 8 Jur. N.
a . 857 and (on appeal) 1001; Jenner v. Jenner, 6 Jur. N. S.
1314. And it must be admitted that to refrain from bringing a
suit on a real'or imaginary cause of action is as good a considera-
tion as to discontinue a well or ill founded suit or defence to a
suit already pending. The contrary presumption is absurd on
its face, and directly at variance with all the cases which hold
that forbearance by a creditor to sue his debtor is a good consi-
deration for a promise by a third person to pay the debt. These
heirs will not be allowed to avail themselves of subsequently dis-
coveied matters to set aside a compromise which would have been
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binding upon 'the wid w at all events; for there can be no
doubt that, as required in Smith v. 13o6m e, 16 Jurist 205;
Brook¢ v. .Afostyn, 10 Jar. N. S. 1114; and Greenwood v. Green-
wood, 2 DeG., J. & S. 28, there was here an honest disclosure by
each party to the other of all such material facts known to either
as bore upon the other's title, and that there was no advantage
taken by either party of the other's ignorance of such facts. A
compromise made under such circumstances will be upheld by the
court; and this settlement will therefore be held to have vested
in A. a valid title to the property conveyed to her in accordance
with it.
And even if A.'s claims to a. share in O.'s estate were not suffi-
ciently well-founded to support this settlement as a compromise
of a doubtful right (though thisr opinion would scarcely seem
maintainable), it is yet an agreement upon a good consideration,
on the principle that any loss or damage to the promisee by ac-
ceding to a contract is a good consideration for such contract.
Had this matter been referred to the courts at the death of C.,
they would have decreed to A. her dower and distributive share;
she would have proceeded at law but for this agreement; and she
has, therefore, lost, by relying on the agreement, just what was
intended to be made up for by the agreement: so that the consi-
deration is not only good and valuable, but, if its adequacy could
be inquired into, exactly adequate. If therefore this were a mere
executory contract, it must now be held valid and binding on the
heirs; having been completely executed, it stands on much
stronger ground. Robertson v. Gardner, 11 Pick. 146. And
viewing this arrangement simply as a contract made upon a
valuable consideration, the heirs of C., if otherwise entitled to
rescind it, could do so only by putting A. into as good a position
as she occupied before the arrangement was made-i. e., by id-
mitting her right to dower and a distributive share of C.'s estate.
That is, they can rescind only by admitting that they have no
right to rescind; therefore they cannot rescind at all.
H. N. SHELDON.
